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Book Reviews
Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. By 
Christopher Andrew. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 
ISBN 978-0-307-26363-6. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices. 
Sources Cited. Index. Pp. xxiii, 1032. $40.00.
Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University is the author of fourteen 
previous books and is noted as Britain's leading expert on the history of 
Intelligence. His reputation for scholarly expertise in that field led 
Britain's Security Service (MI5) to grant him the unprecedented archival 
access necessary to write this work marking MI5s 2009 centenary. The 
result is 851 pages of printed text with another few hundred pages of 
notes, many of which contain narrative that is informative in its own 
right. In short, this is a detailed history of the Security Service, at times 
highly entertaining and informative, always even-handed and well-
written, but nonetheless a tome that is not for the reader with merely 
casual interest in the subject.
From its inauspicious beginnings in 1909, the organization that ulti-
mately took the nomenclature MI5 found its compass throughout World 
War I. The threats of German military espionage and invasion plans at 
that time were highly overrated since there existed only a German naval 
espionage network in Britain, yet the Secret Service Bureau, as it was then 
known, performed admirably in stemming the flow of secret information. 
In the postwar era, focus shifted to the Bolshevik threat, and by 1924 MI5 
"began unraveling the first major Soviet espionage network to be detected 
in Britain" (152). Throughout those early years, however, various govern-
ment agencies jockeyed for primacy in the realm of counterespionage. 
One important case in 1931, in which it was discovered that Scotland 
Yard's Special Branch had been penetrated by Soviet intelligence, led to 
the mission of "countering civil as well as military Communist subver-
sion" being transferred to MI5 (159).
Successes against Soviet penetration were mitigated starting in 1934 with 
the Soviet recruitment of Kim Philby. He and four others, known as the 
Cambridge Five because of their association with that university, probably 
comprised the most competent group of spies ever recruited by a foreign 
intelligence service. Their access was so great and the information 
provided by them so valuable that a paranoid and suspicious Soviet 
intelligence apparatus at one time concluded they were double-agents. 
The resultant, clumsy mishandling of them diminished their usefulness 
somewhat.
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After a rough start in the run-up to World War II, when the Foreign Office 
largely rebuffed MI5's intelligence warnings of Hitler's true intentions, 
the agency went on to win its greatest victories when extensive deception 
operations met unprecedented success. Nazi spies in Britain were quickly 
rounded up, neutralized, or used in "Double-Cross" operations. One of the 
most interesting and unusual deceptions was Operation Mincemeat, in 
which a cadaver dressed as an English soldier was deposited off the coast 
of Spain with a briefcase stuffed with disinformation chained to its wrist. 
The seemingly outlandish ploy was swallowed fully, causing the Germans 
to shift troops to Greece to counter an anticipated invasion actually des-
tined for Sicily. Similarly, so effective was the deception operation sur-
rounding the D-Day invasion that the Germans kept twenty-two divisions 
tied up near the Pas de Calais in anticipation of the real invasion by the 
non-existent First U.S. Army Group.
The early Cold War period took some wind out of the sails of MI5's decep-
tion operations against Britain's former ally. In classic British understate-
ment, one high-ranking official opined that "it would be extremely 
difficult to 'do it again' on the Russians" (318). The 1951 defections of two 
of the Cambridge Five further reduced the prospect of successes. Instead, 
success in ferreting out Soviet agents came as a result of VENONA, the 
painstaking and lengthy deciphering of thousands of intercepted Soviet 
messages sent between 1940 and 1948. Some of the startling revelations 
were the level of Soviet penetration of the United States' own Office of 
Strategic Services—forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency—as well 
as of high levels in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration. But, 
despite some successes, the West continued to struggle against Soviet 
intelligence initiatives throughout the Cold War. It was not until 1971's 
Operation Foot that Soviet espionage operations were severely and more 
or less permanently disrupted in Britain by the mass expulsion of known 
or suspected intelligence officers.
Andrews not only traces the growth and development of MI5, but the 
political and legal climate that fostered it. Home Office Warrants, for 
example, permitted the monitoring of mail and telephone intercepts, yet 
that prerogative and many of the powers with which the agency was 
invested had no basis in law. Still, the government was slow to react, and 
it was not until the late 1980s that legislation was passed to authorize the 
surreptitious entry of premises and eavesdropping measures.
Andrews also discusses the role of women in the organization, first as key 
secretarial staff and much later as operatives in the surveillance branch. 
Women eventually were permitted to handle agents starting in 1978, and 
by 1992 a woman was appointed to head MI5. Andrews also pays some 
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attention to the social atmosphere within MI5 and the class backgrounds 
of its members. Apparently it has traditionally been characterized by a 
genteel environment, with one 1953 recruit being told that one of the best 
things about working there was that "the percentage of bastards is 
extremely low" (832).
Perhaps one of the most interesting chapters is entitled "The Transforma-
tion of the Security Service," in which he describes the 1990s move out of 
the shadows into public view, including the first open advertisement for 
recruits in 1997. As his description of events moves into more recent 
years, Andrews acknowledges that MI5 was a latecomer to the threat of 
Islamic terrorism. Once aware, however, extensive counterterrorist expe-
rience with the Provisional Irish Republican Army likely allowed MI5 to 
step out smartly on the issue of homegrown terrorist threat. Operation 
Crevice successfully warded off attacks against several public venues. 
Returning to earlier techniques, MI5 today maintains regional offices 
responsible for close liaison with local police. Interestingly, Andrews 
attributes some modern systemic deficiencies in intelligence operations to 
something he terms "Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder" HASDD 
(849). In essence, that is a failure to appreciate the events of the past, to 
learn from them, and to avoid the same mistakes in the present time. He 
perceives a "greater continuity between past and present threats to 
national security than is often supposed" (850). While acknowledging 
that some future threats will be unpredictable, Andrews contends that 
security services will be best served with a long-term perspective based on 
knowledge of the past.
Overall this is a first-rate historical treatment of one arm of Britain's intel-
ligence apparatus. The book is comprehensive in its treatment of the sub-
ject—so much so that this brief review can do little justice to its scope—
and despite being officially sanctioned by MI5, it is impartial and fair, dis-
playing beauty marks and warts alike. It is a book well worth the read, 
both as an interesting story and in an effort to reduce our own HASDD.
Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D., Book Review Editor, Journal of Strategic 
Security.
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Red November: Inside the Secret U.S.-Soviet Submarine War. 
By W. Craig Reed. New York, NY: William Morrow Publishers, 
2010. ISBN 978-0-06-180676-6. Maps. Photographs. Notes. 
Index. Pp. 386. $27.99.
In W. Craig Reed's Red November he sets out to produce a history of the 
US-Soviet Submarine operations starting with USS Blenny's (SS-324) 
foray into post-World War II submarine espionage through the public 
outing of cable tapping operations in the mid 1980s. Writing a coherent 
narrative involving vignettes covering over thirty years of operations 
involving thousands of sailors and national security professionals is diffi-
cult, and in the end, the author mostly succeeds.
In Red November's introduction, Reed acknowledges Sherry Sontag and 
Christopher Drew's Blind Man's Bluff, published in 1998. The Sontag/
Drew book was released with plenty of publicity, appeared on "60 Min-
utes," and was a New York Times bestseller for several weeks. Reed notes 
that the book was not only informative and interesting, but also substan-
tially accurate. Nonetheless, he criticizes the book for lacking detail about 
the top-secret Holystone and Ivy Bell programs and admonishes the 
authors for the exclusion of two programs, Boresight and Bulls Eye. 
Therefore the expectation is that his book, given an additional decade of 
time, would be a more comprehensive account of the events over that 
time period. What frustrates the reader is Red November's rehashing of 
events documented in Blind Man's Bluff without adding significantly to 
the research in this field. As you read the book, what jumps out at the 
reader is that this variance in depth of research is driven primarily from 
the author's own experience. The author's father served a key role in two 
aforementioned programs (Boresight and Bulls Eye) that Blind Man's 
Bluff ignored. William J. Reed served as Master Chief and eventually as a 
Lieutenant at the Navy Security Group (NSG) in Washington DC, and the 
chapters concerning his career are the most detailed in the book.
Highlighting another problem with the book is this dubious problem of 
injecting the author into the narrative of a history. Early in the book we 
track the author's father's rise with the NSG from the shores of the 
Bosporus to the installation of many of the Boresight stations globally. It 
reaches its climax with the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the author's exten-
sive interviews with both American and Soviet sub commanders build a 
unique narrative and is the highlight of the book. He honors the partici-
pants on both sides for their professionalism and bravery in the face of 
impossible situations. Additionally, the highlight of LT William J. Reed's 
life is described in detail, when in the heat of the crisis he personally briefs 
President John F. Kennedy. This shift from unique, interesting discus-
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sions of well-documented events (Cuban Missile crisis from the Soviet 
submarine commander's point of view) to the loving tribute to the 
author's father is jarring to say the least.
Pacing is another problem with the book. Certain events, like the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and the events leading up to it, are described in minute 
detail in 150 pages, but then the narrative glances over a decade of history 
in fewer than fifty pages. In this overview of the late 1960s and early '70s, 
he quickly includes the most controversial of events in the conflict, the 
sinking and attempted recovery (by the US) of K-129 and the sinking of 
the USS Scorpion. Many books have been written about these events, but 
Red November highlights only a handful of facts: the late arrival of a dam-
aged USS Swordfish in Yokosuka after the K-129 sunk off Hawaii and 
some cause and effect rhetoric that implies that the Scorpion was sunk in 
response.
The author served in the US Navy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a 
Fire Technician and diver-photographer aboard submarines. Again the 
narrative becomes focused and detailed, this time on deep-sea diving and 
salvage, and on a deck plate view of life aboard a submarine. This section 
also describes the beginning of the installation of decompression cham-
bers and swimmer delivery vehicles on submarines to add in intelligence 
gathering missions conducted underwater. While Blind Man's Bluff 
focused more on the submarine operations from the Captain's chair, Red 
November goes into details of the actual diving operations, including a 
scary story of a collision with a Victor III off Vladivostok.
Throughout Red November, the effect of spies on the conflict is high-
lighted, a point that was somewhat missed in Blind Man's Bluff. The 
Walker spy ring is the most famous, and for a reason: an isolated Chief 
Warrant Officer with unsupervised access to reports from Boresight and 
other programs was able to show the Soviets the degree to which the US 
was able to track their submarines, thereby reducing the West's nuclear 
advantage. Another spy, Ronald Pelton, was instrumental in revealing the 
existence of the underwater recording pods installed on Soviet communi-
cation lines. The fact that the Soviets spent only several million dollars on 
a handful of spies in order to usurp billions of dollars spent in research 
and development in underwater technology is staggering to contemplate.
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The chief criticism of the book is not of what is actually on the page, a 
family's history in the Cold War aboard submarines; the problem lies with 
the way the book is marketed as being more comprehensive than it is. I 
would recommended it for historians of the Cuban Missile Crisis or those 
interested in deep-sea diving and salvage; the rest of the book reads like 
an abridged version of the superiorly-researched Blind Man's Bluff.
Lieutenant Commander David B. Gray, USNR.
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Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis. By 
Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press, 2011. ISBN 978-1-60871-018-8. Pp. 343. $52.95.
Everyone likes to talk about intelligence analysis, but very few are 
involved in doing it; and of those few, only a handful know how to do it 
well, and an ever fewer number have acquired an overview of the entire 
intelligence community. This book is by two persons who have been 
involved in intelligence analysis their entire professional careers; and 
who, having reached the heights of the intelligence establishment, are 
able to look across the entire community and recognize its strengths and 
weaknesses.
To start with, Richards Heuer is the author of The Psychology of Intelli-
gence Analysis, still one of the greatest classics of intelligence literature. 
Randolph Pherson spent more than twenty-eight years at CIA doing intel-
ligence analysis. Both are involved in a multitude of training and educa-
tion efforts for the intelligence community.
Structured Analytic Techniques can best be described as a handbook of 
practical methods of intelligence analysis. It is a "how-to" book. It is 
immediately obvious to the reader that this guide is based on years of 
experience by persons who have on a daily basis used these techniques.
Each chapter describes one tool, and each tool is laid out in exactly the 
same way. There is a discussion of when to use the tool, the value that it 
adds to the analytical process, the potential pitfalls that might be encoun-
tered by a team, followed by a precise discussion of the methodology 
itself. When useful, there are a variety of sample figures showing how the 
data in the method is organized and presented. Each chapter wraps up 
with a brief discussion of how the method relates to other techniques, and 
then a summary of the origin of the technique. Each section also contains 
useful outside references, including sources of supporting software.
The discussion on the origin of the techniques always amazed me. These 
techniques are borrowed from some of the strangest places, such as the 
ancient legal briefs used for the "argument mapping" tool. There is no 
pride of authorship in intelligence analysis; no matter where a technique 
comes from, if it is useful, it is used.
One of the key techniques is the "Analysis of Competing Hypotheses" 
(ACH) technique. This is a core tool that has been developed over the 
years. The book comes with pointers to free ACH software that can be 
downloaded to aid the student (or researchers) in using ACH. Pherson 
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Associates is also working on a "Te@mACH" product that will enable ana-
lysts from different locations to participate simultaneously in an ACH 
exercise.
Approximately fifty different analytical techniques are presented and 
described in detail. They are divided into eight general groups: decompo-
sition and visualization (Gantt charts, process maps, network analysis, 
mind maps, etc.); idea generation ("starbursting," brainstorming); sce-
narios and indicators; hypothesis generation and testing (deception 
detection, ACH, argument mapping); assessment of cause and effect (out-
side-in thinking, prediction markets; role-playing); challenge analysis 
(devil's advocacy, What If? analysis, high-impact/low-probability analy-
sis); conflict management (adversarial collaboration, structured debates); 
and decision support (force field analysis, pros-cons-faults-fixes, SWOT). 
In addition, at the end of the book is a giant overview chart that shows 
how these different techniques fit together and interact with each other.
The book ends with a thoughtful essay on intelligence reform and the 
need for better use of tools, particularly collaboration among different 
teams.
Structured Analytic Techniques should be on the desk of every single per-
son involved in intelligence studies. Professors, students, practitioners, 
even policymakers should each have a copy. The techniques illustrated in 
this book should be a lingua franca of every trainee, and familiarity with 
them should serve as the entry point for anyone interested in intelligence.
Edward M. Roche, Ph.D., J.D., Henley Putnam University.
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The Iraq Effect: The Middle East After the Iraq War. By 
Frederic Wehrey, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jessica Watkins, Jeffrey 
Martini, and Robert A. Guffey. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 
Corporation, 2010. ISBN 978-0-0883-4788-5. Figures. Tables. 
Notes. Sources cited. Pp. xxviii, 187. $40.00.
The ongoing Iraq war is now in its seventh year with no end in sight. End-
less policy debates, media barrages, second guessing, and speculation 
have created so much "white noise" that strategists, policymakers, com-
manders, and decision makers have an overwhelming overload of infor-
mation to process. Into this breach the RAND Corporation, under the 
auspices of Project AIR FORCE, offers The Iraq Effect to cut through the 
discord and cacophony to offer a range of analytic solutions. The book 
examines the "Iraq effect" in terms of how the 2003 U.S. invasion has 
impacted local pro-Washington regimes, anti-terrorism initiatives, and 
Iranian influence in the Middle East. The authors discuss the myriad 
issues confronting the U.S. and then offer a bank of solutions to help steer 
Washington's defense and national security policy deliberations forward.
The authors discuss how the removal of Saddam Hussein from power 
upset the regional balance of power between Iran and its Arab neighbors. 
While Saddam was feared, hated, and not trusted, his presence kept Iran 
at least partially contained in the minds of the Gulf rulers. With Saddam's 
fall from power, Gulf Arabs began to perceive that Iran now had less 
restraint in its regional attempts to spread Shi'a influence and doctrine 
throughout the Middle East.
In the face of resurgent Iranian regional intentions, Gulf regimes have 
responded in various ways: some have attempted to engage Iran, some 
have hedged their bets, and others have tried to balance their foreign pol-
icy objectives between Iranian and U.S. interests. This is due to a duality 
of perception between the "bad Iran" and the "good Iran." The "bad Iran" 
is a destabilizing factor, which seeks to forward its interests in Iraq, the 
Gulf, and the Mediterranean. The "good Iran" is the one that defies the 
U.S. and Israel. Although Gulf states are wary of Iran, they are also uncer-
tain of U.S. intentions. They fear that while Washington currently has an 
antagonistic relationship with Tehran, they also fear that the U.S. may 
eventually affect a rapprochement and leave their Gulf allies adrift. Due to 
this perception of mixed signals, the Gulf states also look to Russia (for 
political alliances) and China (as a customer for energy security) as poten-
tial strategic partners, not to replace Washington, but rather to augment 
it.
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From the Arab viewpoint, the U.S. got sidetracked in Iraq, and this gives 
the Gulf sheikhdoms some latitude in the area of human rights and 
domestic liberalization (prior to the Iraq war, Washington was pushing its 
Arab allies to liberalize, democratize, and emphasize human rights). With 
the Iraq effect, Washington seems less interested in human rights and 
more interested in regional balances of power vis-à-vis Iran. As the U.S. 
places more equity into counterterror initiatives, Arab allies find that 
emphasis a convenient way to get more U.S. funding, as well as justify 
human rights oversights in the names of fighting extremists.
Washington's Arab allies view the U.S. desire for democracy as a destabi-
lizing factor in the region. They point to Iraq's partisan and sectarian vio-
lence being, in their eyes, a result of U.S. democratization efforts, and they 
do not want that same instability in their own countries. Over two million 
Iraqi refugees have flooded into Jordan and Syria, stressing the socioeco-
nomic infrastructures of both countries. This has led to more stringent 
immigration laws in Damascus and Amman. It has also caused the largest 
refugee crisis in the Middle East since the 1948 war that created the state 
of Israel and caused a series of Palestinian refugee crises.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq was initially a boon for al-Qaida (AQ) in that AQ 
could use the presence of foreign military forces to garner support and 
rally a defensive jihad against occupying crusaders. Over time, however, 
AQ's brutal tactics, bloody modus operandi, and indiscriminate attacks 
against civilian targets alienated many would-be supporters. Shi'a insur-
gents, supported by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds 
Force (IRGC-QF), have realized great strides in their technological inno-
vations of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ambush techniques.
The authors offer a variety of recommendations for the U.S. The first is 
that Washington pursue a strategy that allows regional allies to hedge 
their bets with Iran while simultaneously encouraging positive Iranian 
behavior. This recommendation takes into account the understanding 
that collective security based on the structures that formed Cold War alli-
ances will not work in this new paradigm.
The authors also suggest that Washington engage in confidence-building 
measures and multilateral security to provide a buffer between Iran and 
its Gulf neighbors. These measures would include counterterrorism and 
counter-narcotics initiatives, as well as maritime security agreements. 
The authors also recommend an indirect line of communication between 
Israel and Iran, which is unrealistic and naïve.
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A solid recommendation is for Washington to renew and strengthen its 
ties with Ankara. This serves a number of strategic purposes: U.S.-Turkey 
ties were very strong before the Iraq war and have suffered since 2003. A 
renewal of those ties would serve the interests of both countries. Turkey 
could also serve as a communications bridge to Syria and Iran if needed. 
Stronger ties with Beijing and Moscow are also advocated as possible 
means to build alliances in the region based on mutual interests.
The authors encourage Washington to push for political reform in the 
Arab world, yet at the same time caution that many regimes in the region 
use counterterror initiatives to justify human rights abuses. They also 
support the notion that Washington should provide assistance to Iraqi 
refugees to generate good will. The final recommendation is for the U.S. 
to engage in a strategic communications campaign to highlight AQ's fail-
ures in Iraq.
The Iraq Effect is a solid analysis of where the U.S. is in Iraq and where it 
should go from a policy standpoint. It has more utility for the strategic 
planner than for the tactical decision maker. Its analytic approach is ideal 
for intelligence analysts and planners, but is less utilitarian for operators 
or tactical decision makers.
Mark Roberts, Transportation Security Administration.
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